经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (5): 69-79.
• 金融研究 • 上一篇 下一篇
杨柳勇,周强
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YANG Liu-Yong, ZHOU Qiang
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摘要: 本文从银行之间资产回报相关性的角度研究系统性风险,通过构建理论模型考察了存在“多而不倒”救助时资本要求对系统性风险的影响,并且以11个国家(地区)2006—2012年的相关数据为样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明,一定条件下“多而不倒”救助是监管者的最优选择,然而当存在这种“事后”最优政策时,资本要求的提高可能会通过影响银行“事前”投资决策的方式扩大银行之间的系统相关性,提高系统性风险隐患。这一效应在金融自由化程度较低的国家表现得更为显著。中国的资本监管改革应注意与金融市场化改革相协调。
关键词: 资本要求 , 多而不倒 , 系统性风险 , 救助
Abstract: Systemic risk is defined as the correlation of returns on assets held by banks in this paper. Based on a theoretical model, this paper analyzes the relationship between capital requirement and banking systemic risk in the presence of “toomanytofail” bailout. Then this paper makes an empirical test using an unbalanced panel data from 2006 to 2012 of 11 different countries and regions listed commercial banks. The results show that, under certain circumstance,“toomanytofail”bailout is the regulators optimal choice. However, in the presence of this expost optimal policy, an increased capital requirement may induce more systemic risk by affecting banks exante investment decisions. This effect is more significant in counties with low level of financial freedom. Chinas capital regulation reform should coordinate closely with financial marketization reform.
Key words: capital requirement , too many to fail , systemic risk , bailout
杨柳勇, 周强. 资本要求、“多而不倒” 救助与系统性风险[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2014, 34(5): 69-79.
YANG Liu-Yong, ZHOU Qiang. CAPITAL REQUIREMENT,“TOO MANY TO FAIL” BAILOUT AND SYSTEMIC RISK[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2014, 34(5): 69-79.
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http://jjll.ruc.edu.cn/CN/Y2014/V34/I5/69