经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (5): 69-79.

• 金融研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

资本要求、“多而不倒”
救助与系统性风险

杨柳勇,周强   

  1. 浙江大学经济学院,杭州310027
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-24 出版日期:2014-05-16 发布日期:2014-05-26
  • 作者简介:杨柳勇(1964—),男,浙江桐乡人,浙江大学经济学院副院长,博士生导师,管理学博士; 周强(1981—),男,山东胶南人,浙江大学经济学院博士研究生。

CAPITAL REQUIREMENT,“TOO MANY TO FAIL”
BAILOUT AND SYSTEMIC RISK

 YANG  Liu-Yong, ZHOU  Qiang   

  1. School of Economics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
  • Received:2013-06-24 Online:2014-05-16 Published:2014-05-26

摘要: 本文从银行之间资产回报相关性的角度研究系统性风险,通过构建理论模型考察了存在“多而不倒”救助时资本要求对系统性风险的影响,并且以11个国家(地区)2006—2012年的相关数据为样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明,一定条件下“多而不倒”救助是监管者的最优选择,然而当存在这种“事后”最优政策时,资本要求的提高可能会通过影响银行“事前”投资决策的方式扩大银行之间的系统相关性,提高系统性风险隐患。这一效应在金融自由化程度较低的国家表现得更为显著。中国的资本监管改革应注意与金融市场化改革相协调。

关键词: 资本要求 , 多而不倒 , 系统性风险 , 救助

Abstract: Systemic risk is defined as the correlation of returns on assets held by banks in this paper. Based on a theoretical model, this paper analyzes the relationship between capital requirement and banking systemic risk in the presence of “toomanytofail” bailout. Then this paper makes an empirical test using an unbalanced panel data from 2006 to 2012 of 11 different countries and regions listed commercial banks. The results show that, under certain circumstance,“toomanytofail”bailout is the regulators optimal choice. However, in the presence of this expost optimal policy, an increased capital requirement may induce more systemic risk by affecting banks exante investment decisions. This effect is more significant in counties with low level of financial freedom. Chinas capital regulation reform should coordinate closely with financial marketization reform.

Key words: capital requirement , too many to fail , systemic risk , bailout