经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2010, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 68-73.

• 工商管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

私募资本、不完全合约与控制权配置——基于蒙牛乳业的案例研究

许艳芳   

  1. 中国人民大学商学院, 北京, 100872
  • 收稿日期:2009-06-16 出版日期:2010-04-16 发布日期:2012-03-01
  • 基金资助:
    自然科学基金项目(70872106);中国人民大学科研项目(10XNB036)

PRIVATE EQUITY,INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND ALLOCATION OF CONTROL RIGHTS——A Case Study Based on Mengniu Dairy

XU Yan-fang   

  1. Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2009-06-16 Online:2010-04-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要: 控制权配置是私募资本融资中的一个核心问题。利用不完全合约融资理论,本文以蒙牛乳业为研究对象,对我国民营企业引入私募资本融资中的控制权配置问题进行了分析。研究发现,从单次融资的角度看,在私募资本融资中,企业家人力资本不仅直接影响控制权的初始配置,而且间接影响后期公司控制权的相机配置。从不同融资阶段的角度看,随着企业家人力资本逐渐外化,相对于前轮融资,私募基金在后轮融资中掌握更少的控制权,而企业家掌握更多的控制权。本文的研究结论有助于加深学术界对私募资本控制权配置影响因素及其变迁过程的理解。

关键词: 私募资本, 不完全合约, 融资合约理论, 控制权配置

Abstract: This paper analyzes the factors that influence the allocation and transition of firm's control rights when private equity financing is introduced into Chinese private enterprises.By using the method of case study,we find that the analysis results challenge the traditional theory,which stresses that financial capital is the most important factor of deciding the allocation of control rights in firm's financing process.We also note that the entrepreneur's human capital is an important factor which affects the allocation of firm's control rights.As for the transition of firm's control rights,we find that with reduction of information asymmetry,private equity fund in the later financing stage masters less control rights.

Key words: private equity, incomplete contract, financial contract theory, firm’s control rights

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