激励性规制理论的新进展

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (8): 63-68.

激励性规制理论的新进展

张红凤

山东经济学院, 济南, 250014

收稿日期:2005-07-11 出版日期:2005-08-16 发布日期:2012-03-01
基金资助:
山东省社会科学重点项目(04BJJ08)

Received:2005-07-11 Online:2005-08-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 激励性规制理论(the incentive theory of regulation)又称新规制经济学,是产生于20世纪70年代末、80年代初的一个西方规制经济学分支。它是在内外因交织的影响下直接由“规制中的激励问题”这一主题衍生的。内因是传统规制经济学自身发展面临危机,表现在两个方面:一是传统规制经济学由于忽视信息不对称,设计的最优规制方案在应用于实践时缺乏效率,从而遭到质疑,如回报率规制;二是规制替代理论的“引入竞争替代规制,以根治规制无效率”的主张在实践中陷入困境。

中图分类号:

F019

张红凤. 激励性规制理论的新进展[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2005, (8): 63-68.

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