[1] Adolph A. Berle,Gardiner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York: The McMillan Company,1932. [2] Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny. Corporate Ownership AroundtheWorld [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54 (2): 471-517. [3] Claessens Stijn,Simeon Djankov,Larry H. P. Lang. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2): 81-112. [4] Mara Faccio,Larry H. P. Lang. The Ultimate Ownership in Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65 (3): 365-395. [5] Najah Attig,Yoser Gadhoum,Larry Lang. Bid-Ask Spread,Asymmetric Information and Ultimate Ownership [Z]. Laval University,Working Paper,2003. [6] Claessens Stijn,Simeon Djankov,Larry H. P. Lang. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2): 81-112. [7] Heitor Almeida,Daniel Wolfenzon. A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups [Z]. Stern NYU Working paper,2003. [8] Lucien Arya Bebchuk,Christine Jolls. Managerial Value Diversion and Hareholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1999,15 (2): 487-502. [9] Najah Attig,Klaus Fischer,Yoser Gadhoum. On the Determinants,Costs,and Benefits of Pyramidal Ownership:Evidence on Expropriation of Minority Interests [Z]. Laval University,Working Paper,2003. [10] Tarun Khanna,Krishna Palepu. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance 2000,55 (2): 867-891. [11] Cestone Giacinta,Chiara Fumagalli. The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups [J]. Journal of Economics,2005,36 (1): 193-214. [12] Roe Mark. Political Determinants of Corporate Governance [M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2003. [13] Randall Morck,Bernard Yeung. Family Control and the Rent-seeking Society [J]. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice,2004,28 (4): 391-419. [14] Claessens Stijn,Joseph P. H Fan,Larry H. P. Lang. The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation Evidence from East Asia [Z]. Centre for Economic Policy Research,Working Paper,2002. [15] Karl V. Lins,Michael L. Lemmon. Ownership Structure,Corporate Governance,and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58 (4): 1 445-1 468. [16] Marianne Bertrand,Paras Mehta,Sendhil Mullainathan. Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117 (1): 121-148. [17] Yohanes E. Riyanto,Linda A. Toolsema. Tunneling and Propping a Justifcation for Pyramidal Ownership [Z].National University of Singpore,Working Paper,2003. [18] Gugler Klaus,B. Burcin Yurtoglu. Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay out Policy in Germany [J]. European EconomiReview,2003,47 (7): 731-758. [19] Faccio Mara,Larry H. P. Lang,Leslie Young. Divdidends and Expropriation [Z]. AFA 2001 New Orleans; EF-MA Athens 2000,Working Paper,2000. [20] Faccio Mara,Larry H. P. Lang,Leslie Young. Debt and Expropriation [Z]. Centre for Economic Policy Research,Working Paper,2000. [21] Du Julan,Yi Dai. Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure and Capital Structure. Corporate Governance: An International Review,2005,13 (1): 60-71. [22] Yeh Yin-Hua,Pei-Gi Shu,Wen-Yi Huang. The Year-end Anomaly of Taiwanese Family-Controlled Groupings [J]. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 2001,4 (2): 127-163. [23] Perez-Gonzalez,Francisco. Does Inherit Control Hurt Firm Performance [Z]. Columbia University,Working paper,2002. |