经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (10): 57-70.

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数据驱动创新下的隐私监管

  

  1. 1  山东大学经济学院;   2  东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心。
  • 出版日期:2023-10-16 发布日期:2023-11-27
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家自然科学基金项目“数据可携带权规制主导平台的理论基础、作用路径和政策建议”(72373082)、国家自然科学基金项目“大数据背景下隐私监管对平台型企业竞争策略的影响研究”(71973082)、辽宁省社科规划基金项目“遏制滥用视角下加强知识产权保护对企业创新的影响及机制设计研究”(L19BJY018)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人提出的修改意见,笔者已做了相应修改,本文文责自负。

PRIVACY REGULATION UNDER DATADRIVEN INNOVATION

  1. 1.School of Economics,Shandong University;
    2.Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
  • Online:2023-10-16 Published:2023-11-27

摘要: 合理平衡数据驱动创新与消费者隐私保护之间的矛盾,是数字经济时代有效释放数字红利的关键。本文构建理论框架分析当消费者关注个人隐私、企业从事数据驱动创新时的均衡结果和两种隐私监管的福利后果。研究发现,相对于社会最优,企业选择的数据量和数据处理能力过低,而将数据选择权赋予消费者会进一步降低数据量和数据处理能力,从而降低消费者剩余和社会福利;由政府管控数据量能够有效激励企业提高数据处理能力,增加消费者剩余和社会福利。本文结论为政府科学监管企业的数据收集行为提供了理论基础和政策依据。

关键词: 隐私成本, 数据驱动创新, 隐私监管, 福利分析

Abstract: To effectively release the digital dividend in digital economy,it is important to reasonably balance the contradiction between datadriven innovation and privacy infringement This paper proposes a framework to analyze the equilibrium results when firms engage in datadriven innovation and consumers are concerned about privacy,and further analyzes the welfare effects of two types of privacy regulation The result shows that neither the level of data nor data processing capacity that firms choose is adequate from a welfare perspective If consumers choose the level of data,they will choose even less data,thereby reducing firms’ data processing capacity and lowering consumer surplus and social welfare However,if the government regulates the level of data,it can effectively encourage firms to improve data processing capacity,thereby increasing consumer surplus and social welfare Such findings provide theoretical guidance and policy basis for the government to scientifically regulate firms’ data collecting behavior

Key words: privacy cost, datadriven innovation, privacy regulation, welfare analysis