经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9): 97-112.

• • 上一篇    

薪酬管制与会计信息质量*——基于超额薪酬的中介效应

  

  1. 中国人民大学商学院
  • 出版日期:2022-09-16 发布日期:2022-10-11
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家社会科学基金重大项目“面向国际趋同的国家统一会计制度优化路径研究”(16ZDA029)、财政部会计名家培养工程和中国人民大学2020年度拔尖创新人才培育计划资助。

PAYMENT CEILING AND THE QUALITY OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION——Based on Mediating Effect of Excess Payment

  1. School of Business,Renmin University of China
  • Online:2022-09-16 Published:2022-10-11
  • Supported by:

     

摘要: 在国有企业收入分配制度改革的大背景下,本文检验了薪酬管制政策对国有企业管理者超额薪酬与会计信息质量的影响。研究发现超额薪酬与会计信息质量呈U型关系;薪酬管制通过削减超额薪酬,进而降低了会计信息质量;现行薪酬管制政策的限薪标准缺乏针对性,致使政策的实施不仅削减了过度激励情形下国有企业管理者的超额薪酬,同时还加剧了部分国有企业管理者激励不足的情况;实施股权激励与提高审计质量均有助于弱化薪酬管制的负面影响。研究结论表明,现有薪酬管制政策有效但精准程度有待进一步提升,未来国有企业薪酬制度改革应在兼顾成本效益的基础上细化限薪标准,力争因地制宜、精准限薪。

关键词: 薪酬管制, 超额薪酬, 会计信息质量

Abstract: Under the background of stateowned enterprises (SOEs) compensation system reform,this paper examines the influence of payment ceiling on managers' excess payment and the quality of accounting information of SOEsThe results show that,there is a Ushaped relationship between managers' excess payment and the quality of accounting information;payment ceiling reduces SOEs' quality of accounting information by reducing excess payment of managers;the policy effect of payment ceiling is not targeted,and it significantly reduces the excess compensation of underincentive group and overincentive group without difference;the implementation of equity incentives and improving audit quality will help to weaken the negative impact of payment ceilingThe conclusion of this paper shows that the existing payment ceiling is effective,but the salary limit standard is relatively roughThe future reform of salary system of SOEs should refine payment ceiling standard based on the balance of cost and benefit and strive to adapt measures to local conditions and use precise salary limit.

Key words: payment ceiling, excess compensation, quality of accounting information