关键词: 高管降薪政策, 企业创新, 高管激励, 国有企业分类

Abstract: Using the differenceindifference (DID) method and a sample containing the operating data of Ashare listed companies in China between 2010 and 2019, this study tests the impact of the executive compensation limit policy on enterprise innovation. The result shows that, compared with the nonstateowned enterprises (NSOEs), the policy inhibited the innovation investment of the stateowned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, the degree of inhibition of the policy on enterprise innovation is different across the SOEs with different functions. Public welfare stateowned enterprises are more restrained by the second executive pay cut order than commercial stateowned enterprises. This study provides empirical evidence and policy implications for the executive compensation limit in SOEs and enterprise innovation, as well as enriching the research of the executive compensation limit policy.

Key words: executive compensation limit policy, enterprise innovation, executive incentives, stateowned enterprise classification