关键词: 审计监督, 政府审计, 个体效应, 国企治理, 超额在职消费

Abstract: This paper studies the individual governance effect of audit supervision on stateowned enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of the excess perk of local SOEs' executives. Based on the data of local listed SOEs from 2007 to 2017 and taking the supervision background of the local audit leaders as a starting point, this paper empirically examines the individual governance effect of audit supervision on the excess perk of local SOEs' executives under strict supervision atmosphere. It is found that the supervision background of the local audit leaders can significantly inhibit the excess perk of local SOE's executives, and this result is mainly reflected in the strict supervision period starting from 2013. The above results are robust to a variety of endogenous and robustness tests. Further analyses indicate that the negative relationship between the supervision background of the local audit leaders and the excess perk of local SOEs' executives is not only affected by the motivation and ability of audit supervision, but also affected by the internal and external governance mechanism of local SOEs. Finally, the supervision background of the local audit leaders effectively alleviates the firm value impairment and stock price crash risk caused by the excess perk of local SOEs' executives.

Key words: audit supervision, government audit, individual effect, SOEs' governance, excess perk