关键词: 耕地红线, 土地招商, 级差地租, 区域统筹发展

Abstract: Regions across China strive to catch up and overtake one another. Under economic development patterns and regional tax competition with Chinese characteristics, FDI attraction game among local governments easily evolved into land price war in the form of offering cheap land and preferential land supply policies. To mitigate the land resource waste problem caused by such game among local governments, the central government imposed a land quota system (Red line of 1.8 billion mu farmland policy). Employing new economic geography model, this paper analyzes the impact of the land quota on interregional FDI competition. It is found that, although the land quota cannot completely overcome the efficiency loss related to insufficient agglomeration caused by the interregional competition, it is helpful to mitigate the problem related to the race to the bottom game. A dually coordinated land supply and revenuesharing system managed by central government will overcome both issues of insufficient agglomeration and race to the bottom game, enhance interregional harmonization development, and allow all citizens to more equally benefit from national economic development. At the ongoing transitional period, it is urgent to establish a nationwide land quota trading system to facilitate crossregional transactions of land resources.

Key words: land quota, FDI competition by land, differential rent, interregional coordinated development