经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (2): 54-69.

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银行业联合授信制度制约企业的非效率投资了吗*——基于沪深A股公司的分析

  

  1. 江西财经大学金融学院
  • 出版日期:2021-02-16 发布日期:2021-02-23
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家自然科学基金项目(71962012)、江西省学位与研究生教育教学改革研究项目(JXYJG2015069)的资助。

HAS THE JOINT CREDIT SYSTEM OF BANKING INDUSTRY CONSTRAINED CORPORATE INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT——An Analysis Based on Ashare Companies

  1. School of Economics and Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
  • Online:2021-02-16 Published:2021-02-23

摘要: 中国银保监会出台联合授信管理制度旨在抑制企业过度融资行为,提高资金使用效率。为检验该制度是否达到预期效果,采用2014—2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,运用非平衡面板数据回归实证考察联合授信机制对企业非效率投资的影响,发现联合授信对企业的非效率投资(包含投资不足和投资过度)呈现显著抑制效应,其中联合授信对投资过度的抑制效应最大。进一步研究发现,相较于国有、大规模、低负债、高盈利等异质属性的企业,联合授信对非国有、小规模、高负债、低盈利等属性企业的非效率投资(尤其是投资过度)抑制效应更为显著。

关键词: 联合授信, 非效率投资, 投资过度

Abstract: The joint credit policy issued by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission aims to restrain excessive financing activities of companies and improve the efficiency of funds. In order to test whether the system has achieved the expected results, this paper adopts the unbalanced panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen Ashare listed companies from 2014 to 2018 to exam the influence of joint credit system on corporate inefficient investment. The empirical research shows that joint credit system has significant inhibitory effects on the inefficient investment (including underinvestment and overinvestment). Especially, the joint credit system has the strongest inhibitory effect on overinvestment. Further investigation shows that compared with stateowned, largescale, lowdebt, highprofit companies, the joint credit system has a more significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment (especially overinvestment) behavior of nonstateowned, smallscale, highdebt, lowprofit companies.

Key words: joint credit, inefficient investment, overinvestment