经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (10): 50-64.

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银行竞争与僵尸企业去杠杆*

  

  1. 西南财经大学会计学院
  • 出版日期:2021-10-16 发布日期:2021-11-01
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家自然科学基金项目(71972157,71672149,71620107005)、高等学校学科创新引智计划(B18043)、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(220410004005040290)的资助。

BANK COMPETITION AND ZOMBIEFIRMS' DELEVERAGING

  1. School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
  • Online:2021-10-16 Published:2021-11-01

摘要: 本文将银监会公布的金融许可证信息与中国工业企业数据库相匹配,考察了银行竞争对僵尸企业资本结构动态调整的影响机理。研究发现,银行竞争通过提高僵尸企业的融资成本显著加快了其资本结构调整速度,尤其是降杠杆的幅度。进一步研究表明,在货币政策宽松期,银行竞争对僵尸企业降杠杆的促进效果会更明显。此外,预算软约束小、外部融资依赖程度高、规模小的僵尸企业去杠杆的速度更快。本文立足于中国金融体系深化开放的现实情境,聚焦于僵尸企业这一特定主体的资本结构决策,为金融市场的竞争机制如何助力僵尸企业去杠杆提供了一定经验证据。

关键词: 银行竞争, 僵尸企业, 去杠杆

Abstract: Matching the financial license information published by CBRC with the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, this paper investigates the mechanism through which bank competition influences zombie firms’ dynamic capital structure adjustmentThe results exhibit that by raising firms’ financing cost, bank competition has significantly accelerated the speed of zombie firms’ capital structure adjustment, especially the extent of deleveragingFurthermore, the impact of bank competition on the zombie firms’ deleveraging is more pronounced during easy monetary policy periodMoreover, zombie firms with lower level of soft budget constraints, higher dependence on external financing and smaller size have faster deleveraging paceThis paper focuses on the specific zombie firms’ deleveraging behavior under China's financial system which is gradually deepening openingup, and provides empirical evidence for how the competition mechanism of the financial market advances zombie enterprises’ deleveraging

Key words:  , bank competition, zombie firms, deleveraging