关键词: 地方国企, 持股银行, 官员晋升

Abstract: This paper investigates the motivations and effects of local stateowned enterprises holding commercial banks' ownership. First of all, this paper finds that compared with other stateowned enterprises, the stateowned enterprises whose actual controllers are local governments or local SASACs (Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) are more likely to hold ownership of commercial banks; moreover, they prefer to hold the ownership of commercial banks which are located in the same provinces or cities where the stateowned enterprises are registered. Second, this relationship is more prominent among the stateowned enterprises whose registration is provincial capitals, with lower level of marketization of the financial industry, or with younger governors. Third, after the issuance of policies to promote the development of the banking industry, the local stateowned enterprises have a higher probability of holding ownership of commercial banks. Last, based on the analysis of economic consequences, we find that holding commercial banks' ownership is conducive to promoting regional financial development and increasing the promotion of local officials. This study shows that the behavior of local SOEs holding commercial banks mainly reflects the motivation of local governments and officials.

Key words: local stateowned enterprises, holding banks, official promotion