关键词: 指标控制, 矿难, 安全生产, 治理

Abstract: China has made significant achievement in governing and reducing coal mine accidents, but the research on the successful experiences is still insufficient. This paper considers that the quota of total death number is an effective way to reduce the number of deaths caused by coal mine accidents. In this paper, we manually collect the firmlevel number of deaths of coal mine accidents and provincelevel quotas of deaths of production safety in 2002-2006, and merge them with CIED. We find that the number of accident deaths of a coal mine is negatively related with the other firms in the same region, indicating that there is a “competing for quotas” phenomenon. The results of generalized DID model show that in provinces with less quotas, the coal mine firms compete more intensely. Heterogeneity analysis shows that competition has become more intense both in the overquotas provinces and during the time when officials promotion yet to be decided. Finally, we find that the coal mine accident death in a single firm is not correlated with that of other firms in the near prefectures but not the same province, excluding the “deterrent effect” of increased supervision resulting from the mining accidents. The results in this research show that the quota of deaths has significant effect on reducing deaths.

Key words: quota, coal mine accident, production safety, governance