关键词: 委托代理理论, 制度基础, 双边对称信任, 效率改善

Abstract: Based on the assumption of “economic man's rationality”, the principalagent theory in the new institutional economics has designed a precise, exquisite and delicate principalagent system, which effectively resolves the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent in modern enterprises and improves the operation efficiency of the enterprises. However, the practice of modern enterprises has proved that even though the principalagent system is very precise, exquisite and delicate, it still has not completely solved the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent and the further improvement of the efficiency of enterprise operation. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the theoretical perspective from the hypothesis of “economic man rationality” to “economic man + social man + family man composite rationality”, so as to realize the expansion of the theoretical perspective of principalagent theory. Using the new institutional economics research method and the bilateral symmetric trust mathematical model, this paper proves that: based on the principalagent system, further strengthening the bilateral symmetric trust between principals and agents can further resolve their conflicts of interest and improve the efficiency of enterprise operation. Based on this conclusion, the specific path of strengthening bilateral symmetric trust between principal and agent is optimizing the social trust environment system.

Key words: principalagent theory, institutional basis, bilateral symmetrical trust, efficiency improvement