经济理论与经济管理

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经理任期、声誉效应与过度投资*——U型理论与经验证据

米运生1,杨天健1,石晓敏1,李宇豪2#br#   

  1. 1      华南农业大学国家农业制度与发展研究院;      2    中国工商银行广东省分行北京路支行。
  • 出版日期:2019-06-16 发布日期:2019-06-20
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AJY015)和广东省教育厅创新团队项目(2017WCXTD001)的资助。

MANAGER S TENURE,REPUTATION EFFECT AND OVERINVESTMENT——Ushaped Theory and Empirical Analysis

MI Yunsheng1,YANG Tianjian1,SHI Xiaomin1,LI Yuhao2#br#   

  1. 1National School of Agricultural Institution and Development,South China Agricultural University;
    2Beijing Road SubBranch,Guangdong Branch,Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
  • Online:2019-06-16 Published:2019-06-20

摘要: 声誉效应可以缓解代理冲突并抑制过度投资,但其效果却随任期期限临近而衰退。本文理论分析了企业过度投资与经理任期之间的U型关系。以中国A股上市公司为样本,运用门限自回归实证模型,进行实证分析。本文研究发现:作为声誉效应的代理变量,经理任期对过度投资的影响呈U型。在经理任期达到特定门限值42个月之前,经理任期与过度投资呈负相关关系。在门限值之后,声誉效应逐渐失去作用,随着经理任期的增加,过度投资程度提高。

关键词: 经理任期 , 声誉效应 , 过度投资 , U型关系 , 门限自回归模型

Abstract: The reputation effect is thought to be a method to moral hazard and curb overinvestmentBut reputational effects also has flawsIts effect will be accelerated recession when manager s tenure is off office approachThis paper theoretically analyzes the Ushaped relationship between overinvestment and manager s tenure and give an empirical analysis of listed companies in Chinese A shares market by using TAR modelThe paper draws the following conclusions: as a proxy variable of reputation effect,the influence of manager s tenure on overinvestment is UshapedManagers tenure is negatively related to overinvestment before its threshold (42 months)The degree of overinvestment increased after managers tenure reached its thresholdAt this time,the reputation loses its effect gradually

Key words: manager s tenure , reputation effect , overinvestment , Ushaped relationship , TAR mode