关键词: 系统重要性银行 , 大而不倒 , 市场约束 , 系统性风险 , 事件研究法

Abstract: Due to the toobigtofail problem, effective regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) is always an important issue for regulators. Based on Pillar III of the Basel Capital Accord, namely market discipline, and event study methodology, this paper analyses the stock market reaction to 9 regulatory events of Chinas global systemically important banks (GSIBs) proposed by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Financial Stability Board and China Banking Regulatory Commission and compares the stock price reaction of GSIBs and nonGSIBs. Results show that only one of the events cause negative stock price reaction of GSIBs while others do not cause significant market reaction, which shows ineffective market discipline and indicates that most regulatory measures did not reduce the moral hazard problem of Chinas SIBs effectively.

Key words: systemically important banks , toobigtofail , market discipline , systemic risk , event study