关键词: 高管激励契约 , 企业生命周期 , 最优动态配置 , 代理成本

Abstract: Executives  incentive effect mostly depends on collocation status of the whole incentive contracts system. The optimal collocation of incentive contracts must follow the enterprises  lifecycle processing rule, which is guided by executives  sensitivity towards their own utility of both monetary and nonmonetary forms. Based on lifecycle theory and principleagent theory, this paper explains the change regulation of executives  utility and the features of three incentive mechanisms, based on which the optimal dynamic collocation of incentive contracts. By using Chinese hightech listed corporations  panel data as research sample, the impacts upon agency cost from incentive contracts have been tested. Empirical results show that, during both growing and decaying periods, compensation incentive contract can restrain agency costs significantly. Meanwhile executive  reputation incentive mechanism has the same influence towards agency costs while corporations in mature stage. However, the governance effect from control right incentive is not significant. On the contrary, it boosts agency cost during the corporations decaying period. Accordingly, in order to realize the optimal incentive effect, the term structure of compensation incentive should be optimized, and constancy of reputation incentive should be extended. Meanwhile, setting up efficient control rights management system is also essential to promote executives  incentive effect.

Key words: incentive contracts , lifecycle , optimal collocation , agency cost