中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究*
——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (5): 88-97.

中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究*
——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析

潘孝珍1,庞凤喜2

1 杭州电子科技大学会计学院; 2 中南财经政法大学财税学院。

出版日期:2015-05-16 发布日期:2015-05-22
作者简介:潘孝珍，杭州电子科技大学会计学院，邮政编码：310018，邮箱：hdupxz@163com；庞凤喜，中南财经政法大学财税学院。
基金资助:
本文得到国家社会科学基金重大项目“宏观税负、税负结构与结构性减税研究”（12&ZD044）、教育部人文社科青年基金项目“两型社会视角下我国环境税体系重构研究”（10YJC790326）的资助。

CORPORATE INCOME TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA ——An Empirical Analysis of Panel Data Based on the Spatial Lag Model

PAN Xiao-Zhen-1,PANG Feng-Xi-2

1School of Accounting, Hangzhou Dianzi University; 2School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Online:2015-05-16 Published:2015-05-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： There is no independent legislative power of tax in China's local governments, but they still can take Chinesestyle tax competition through preferential corporate income tax. Based on the construction of provincial preferential corporate income tax measurement, this paper uses the spatial lag model of panel data to conclude that, there is complementary strategy type of tax competition between local governments in China, and the competition in normal preferential corporate income tax is more intense than real preferential tax. The central government should start from the nominal preferential corporate income tax, take measures to regulate corporate income tax competition behavior between local governments, but should also keep the continuity of government's preferential tax policy and its implementation effect.

关键词: local government , corporate income tax competition , normal preferential tax , real preferential tax

Abstract: There is no independent legislative power of tax in China's local governments, but they still can take Chinesestyle tax competition through preferential corporate income tax. Based on the construction of provincial preferential corporate income tax measurement, this paper uses the spatial lag model of panel data to conclude that, there is complementary strategy type of tax competition between local governments in China, and the competition in normal preferential corporate income tax is more intense than real preferential tax. The central government should start from the nominal preferential corporate income tax, take measures to regulate corporate income tax competition behavior between local governments, but should also keep the continuity of government's preferential tax policy and its implementation effect.

Key words: local government , corporate income tax competition , normal preferential tax , real preferential tax

潘孝珍1,庞凤喜2. 中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究*
——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2015, 35(5): 88-97.

PAN Xiao-Zhen-1,PANG Feng-Xi-2. CORPORATE INCOME TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA ——An Empirical Analysis of Panel Data Based on the Spatial Lag Model[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2015, 35(5): 88-97.