关键词: 投资效率 , 职业生涯关注 , 反腐 , 代理问题

Abstract:

The principalagent issue in central SOEs is obviously reflected in the low efficiency of investment. Under the theoretical framework of principalagent issues, this paper applies the listed firms owned by central government in China from 2003 to 2014 as samples, and discusses the relationship between career concerns incentive and investment efficiency in Chinas central SOEs. We also investigate whether the anticorruption storm whipped up from the end of 2012 eases the relationship above. The empirical results show that investment efficiency decreases if career concerns incentive of the management is weakened. The anticorruption storm eases overinvestment but intensifies underinvestment in the given situation. This paper respectively analyzes formation mechanism of overinvestment and underinvestment supervened with the weakening incentive of the management, and provides helpful references for improving corporate governance as well as balancing incentive system in Chinas central SOEs.

Key words: investment efficiency ,  career concerns , anticorruption , principalagent issues