关键词: 企业集团 , 关联交易 , 掏空 , 支持 , 相互保险

Abstract:

Existing literatures have arguments on business groups function for its facilitating the controlling shareholder tunneling or propping the listed companies. Considering the dynamic interactions of tunneling and propping may overcome the limitation of single perspective. This paper investigates the timing selection, tool difference and economic consequences of tunneling and propping interactions. The results show that when listed companies facing delisted risk, controlling shareholder provides supports by both financing and nonfinancing RPTs. In turn, when controlling shareholder falls into financial crisis, only financing RPTs is provided by listed companies. The asymmetry interactions consist of coinsurance relationship among members of business groups, and the natural experiment based on RPTs regulatory policy change provides additional evidence. This finding has policy implications that regulators should make RPTs policies more flexible especially under crisis circumstance.

Key words: business group , related party transactions , tunneling , propping , coinsurance