关键词: 终极控制权 , 大股东制衡 , 信息披露 , 第二类代理问题 , 特殊资产保护 , 治理战略

Abstract: From the perspectives of type II agency problem and protection of specialized assets and based on the theory of ultimate control rights, this paper discussed the impacts of counterbalance mechanism of blockholders between controlling shareholders and other blockholders on information disclosure strategy and quality of Chinese listed companies. The empirical analysis indicated as following: (1) controlling shareholders with higher control rights were inclined to disclose apparently reliable and timely information to delude the market and small investors, but had less motivation to improve the relevancy of information disclosure; (2) controlling shareholders with higher cash flow rights or involvement of specialized assets most probably manipulated information disclosure in order to enhance its reliability and timeliness, but had less motivation to improve its relevancy; (3) other blockholders were inclined to counteract information manipulation by controlling shareholders, resulting in “negative impacts” on the reliability and timeliness of information disclosure; (4) it was significant Ushape between counterbalance degree of other blockholders and reliability and timeliness of information disclosure.

Key words: ultimate control right , blockholders counterbalance , information disclosure , type II agency problem , specialized assets protection , governance strategy