经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (6): 71-82.

• 金融研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

效率促进还是掏空——大股东参与定向增发的效应研究

 许荣, 刘洋   

  1. 中国人民大学财政金融学院
  • 收稿日期:2012-04-23 出版日期:2012-06-16 发布日期:2012-06-29
  • 作者简介:许荣(1975—),男,江苏句容人,中国人民大学财政金融学院中国财政金融政策研究中心副教授,经济学博士; 刘洋(1988—),男,山东荣成人,中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社科青年基金项目成果(12YJC790217)

VALUE-ADDED OR TUNNELING——A Study on Controlling Shareholders in the Equity Private Placement

 XU  Rong, LIU  Yang   

  1. School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2012-04-23 Online:2012-06-16 Published:2012-06-29

摘要: 大股东认购上市公司定向增发的股份,理论上存在效率促进和掏空两种动机。本文实证发现,大股东认购上市公司定向增发股份的比率和市场公告效应显著正相关。这一正向市场公告效应是由大股东资产认购而不是股份增持或现金融资造成的。进一步的研究通过定向增发完成后一年股票收益率和公司会计绩效变动,为大股东资产认购参与定向增发具有显著的效率促进效应提供了实证证据。这一研究为企业集团通过内部资产重组从而优化资源配置提供了支持,同时也对定向增发宣告效应提出了新的解释。

关键词: 企业集团 , 掏空 , 效率促进 , 定向增发

Abstract: Theoretically, controlling shareholders would choose either tunneling or propping when participating in the equity private placements. This research explored that market reaction around the announcement date was positively related to the ratio of controlling shareholders acquired, which was the result of asset transfer rather than increasing equity shares in cash. Further study provided empirical evidence that it was efficiencyimproved when controlling shareholders took part in the equity private placement by analyzing the one year rate of return and performance of the listed companies after the equity private placement. This research supported the hypothesis that business groups could facilitate internal resource allocation through asset reorganization and also gave new explanation to the announcement effect and the price discount of private placements.

Key words: corporate group , tunneling , propping , equity private placement