经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (11): 78-83.

• 金融研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

上市公司股权激励问题探析

 宫玉松   

  1. 山东财经大学
  • 收稿日期:2012-06-18 出版日期:2012-12-20 发布日期:2012-12-03
  • 作者简介:宫玉松(1964—),男,山东烟台人,山东财经大学经济学院教授,经济学博士。

ANALYSIS ON THE EQUITY INCENTIVE OF LISTED COMPANY

 GONG  Yu-Song   

  1. Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China
  • Received:2012-06-18 Online:2012-12-20 Published:2012-12-03

摘要: 股权激励制度曾被视为降低经理层代理成本、完善公司治理的良方,但安然事件等一系列公司丑闻逐渐暴露出该制度的弊端。近年来股权激励制度在我国上市公司迅速推广,一些公司通过股权激励取得了“公司业绩增长,股价上涨,投资者受益,公司高管暴富”的“多赢”局面,实际上在表面繁荣、貌似合法与市场化的背后隐藏着大量问题,部分公司的股权激励已被扭曲为公司管理层牟取暴利的寻租工具。这表明,在资本市场有效性程度低、上市公司治理不规范的情况下,不宜大规模推广股权激励制度。

关键词: 股权激励 , 行权条件 , 行权价格 , 机会主义 , 高管自利

Abstract: he equity incentive regarded as an efficient mechanism to lower agent cost and improve corporate governance. However the Enron case had exposed the shortcomings of this mechanism. In recent years, the system of equity incentive grew up rapidly in Chinas listed company, which led to some seemingly inspired results in raising the stock price and benefiting the investors. In fact, the system of equity incentive had been distorted as the tool of rent seeking. This paper showed the equity incentive was not suitable for the market with low capital efficient and poor corporate governance.

Key words: equity incentive vesting conditions , exercise price , opportunism , senior management self-interest