经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2010, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 19-24.

• 理论探索 • 上一篇    下一篇

地方政府的介入与农信社信贷资源错配

陈雨露, 马勇   

  1. 中国人民大学, 北京, 100872
  • 收稿日期:2010-01-12 出版日期:2010-04-16 发布日期:2012-03-01

THE CREDIT MISALLOCATION OF RCC UNDER THE INTERVENTION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

CHEN Yu-lu, MA Yong   

  1. China Financial Policy Research Center, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2010-01-12 Online:2010-04-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要: 随着农信社管理权重新划归地方政府,农信社的信贷行为出现了更为明显的"脱农变异"取向,而地方政府试图对农信社肆意改造和干预背后所暗含的内在隐忧也不容忽视。本文通过构建地方政府介入后的农信社信贷资源决策模型发现,当地方政府介入后,农信社的信贷资金供给会出现明显的"错配"现象,而"错配"的程度随着地方保护主义的强化而加重。通过引入外部金融监管机制,可以在一定程度上遏制地方政府的保护主义行为,减轻信贷资源"错配"程度。

关键词: 地方政府, 农信社, 信贷资源, 错配

Abstract: As the rural credit cooperative(RCC) is again under the direct governance of local governments,the financial supply of the RCC deviates far from the traditional rural finance.If local governments try to intervene with the credit allocation of the RCC,the involved risk cannot be simply ignored.This paper from the perspective of political economy conducts an economic analysis of the credit allocation mechanism of the RCC and indicates that with the intervention of the local governments,the RCC may misallocate its credit supply and the local protectionism may further aggravate the degree of misallocation.This paper suggests that the external financial supervision should be adopted to alleviate the local protectionism so that the credit misallocation of the RCC can be ameliorated.

Key words: local government, rural credit cooperative(RCC), credit supply, misallocation

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