义务教育学校绩效工资改革的经济学分析——基于委托—代理理论的分析框架

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2010, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 52-58.

义务教育学校绩效工资改革的经济学分析——基于委托—代理理论的分析框架

李萍, 盘宇章, 吕荣

西南财经大学, 成都, 610074

收稿日期:2009-11-20 出版日期:2010-02-16 发布日期:2012-03-01
基金资助:
西南财经大学“211”工程三期重点学科建设项目“中国特色社会主义市场经济基础理论创新”

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE MERIT PAY REFORM IN COMPULSORY SCHOOL——Based on the Framework of Principal-Agent Theory

LI Ping, PAN Yu-zhang, LU Rong

South Western University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China

Received:2009-11-20 Online:2010-02-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文利用委托—代理理论,对义务教育学校绩效工资改革中教师行为和地方政府行为分别进行了分析。研究发现,绩效工资的最优设计是,工资函数中包含一个固定支付和一个可变支付,这样可以有效减少教师的道德风险行为;如果地方政府掌握了关于教师绩效方面较多的信息,并且改革的政治成本和管理成本较小时,将有利于绩效工资改革的推行。

关键词: 绩效工资, 委托—代理, 道德风险

Abstract: In this paper,we applied principal-agent model to explain teachers and local government's behavior in the context of merit pay reform at compulsory school.We found that the optimal incentive design of merit pay scheme guarantees the teacher a fixed payment,plus a variable payment thereby reducing moral hazard.If local governments know about more information about teacher performance,and the political costs and management costs of reform is smaller,that makes reform more likely.

Key words: merit pay, principal-agent, moral hazard

中图分类号:

F244

李萍, 盘宇章, 吕荣. 义务教育学校绩效工资改革的经济学分析——基于委托—代理理论的分析框架[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2010, (2): 52-58.

LI Ping, PAN Yu-zhang, LU Rong. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE MERIT PAY REFORM IN COMPULSORY SCHOOL——Based on the Framework of Principal-Agent Theory[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2010, (2): 52-58.

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[2] 实证研究发现,家庭收入状况、父母的职业和受教育程度以及学生自身的天赋等因素都会在一定程度上影响学生的成绩,这些因素通常被视做"学生质量".
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