经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2007, Vol. ›› Issue (7): 33-39.

• 金融研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府行为、系统性风险与金融稳定性

于润, 孙武军   

  1. 南京大学经济学院金融与保险学系, 南京, 210093
  • 收稿日期:2007-06-04 出版日期:2007-07-16 发布日期:2012-03-01

GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR,SYSTEMATIC RISK,AND FINANCIAL STABILITY

YU Run, SUN Wu-jun   

  1. Department of Finance and Insurance, School of Economics, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2007-06-04 Online:2007-07-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要: 通过企业、银行、地方政府和中央政府四方目标函数的分析和构建博弈模型的论证,得到的结论是:以GDP等数量指标为导向的政绩考核制度和中央与地方之间存在严重的信息不对称,是近年来中央政府时常陷入“经济增长与宏观调控两难”窘境的主要原因。为此,必须尽快改革政绩考核制度,创建银行信贷监测系统,提高中央对地方经济相关信息的可获得性,有效地导向地方政府行为,在制度上提高金融稳定性和管理的科学性。

关键词: 政府行为, 系统性风险, 金融稳定性

Abstract: By analyzing the four objective functions of firms,banks,local and central government and building game-theory model,this paper finds that the main reason of "economic growth and macroeconomic control" dilemma is the checking system based on GDP and other index and the asymmetric information between central and local government.Therefore,in order to effectively guide the local government behavior and increase the financial stability and scientifically management,we should reform the checking system,build the supervising system of bank credit,and increase the availability of local economic data.

Key words: government behavior, systematic risk, financial stability

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