Abstract: Based on the “crowding out effect” of the existing financial asset allocation on main business in stateowned enterprises, this paper discusses the influence of nonstateowned and stateowned equity checks and balances on financialization from the mixedownership perspective. The study finds that there is a Ushaped relationship between the balance of mixedownership and the level of financial asset allocation, and the promotion effect is more obvious when nonstateowned shares exceed stateowned shares. The mediating effect test finds that, within the “ inhibition” range, the balance of mixed ownership reduces the level of financial asset allocation by alleviating the agency problem, while within the “promotion” range, the balance of mixed ownership improves financial asset allocation by intensifying the agency problem. Further research shows that, compared with longterm investment financial assets, the balance of mixed ownership is more sensitive to shortterm speculative financial assets. There is a linear negative correlation between the balance of mixedownership and the level of financial asset allocation in central enterprise. The relationship is still Ushaped in local stateowned enterprises. The Ushaped relationship between the balance of mixedownership and the allocation of financial assets only exists in industries of commercial competition. This study has certain reference value for the mixedownership reform and the theory and practice of financial asset allocation.

Key words: ownership balance degree of mixedownership reform, financial asset allocation, agency problem

摘要： 针对目前国有企业存在金融资产配置的主业“挤出效应”现象，本文从国企混改视角探讨了非国有与国有股权制衡对“脱实向虚”的影响。研究发现混改股权制衡度与金融资产配置水平之间存在U型关系，且当非国有股权占比超过国有股权占比时促进作用更加明显。中介效应检验发现，在“抑制”区间内，混改股权制衡度通过缓解代理问题降低了金融资产配置水平；在“促进”区间内，混改股权制衡度通过激化代理问题引发了金融资产配置水平的提高。另外，相比长期投资性金融资产，混改股权制衡度主要对短期投机性金融资产的影响更加敏感。当样本为央企时，混改股权制衡度与金融资产配置水平呈现线性负相关关系。当样本为地方国企时，两者仍然为U型关系。混改股权制衡度与金融资产配置之间的U型关系仅体现在商业竞争类行业中。本文的研究对混合所有制改革以及金融资产配置的理论与实践具有一定的参考价值。

关键词: 混改股权制衡度, 金融资产配置, 代理问题