上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2002, Vol. ›› Issue (9): 47-52.

上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计

张建森, 蒋露洲

复旦大学经济学院上海200433

收稿日期:2002-07-31 出版日期:2002-09-16 发布日期:2012-03-01

STOCK PRICES OF LISTED COMPANIES AND CONTRACT DESIGNING OF MANAGER SALARIES

ZHANG Jian-sen, JIANG Lu-zhou

School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2002-07-31 Online:2002-09-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在成熟规范市场,由于股票价格长期看能比较准确地反映企业的市场价值,所以股票价格可作为经理人的长期和综合的业绩度量指标。股票价格的主要激励工具为经理人期权和限制性股权,期权作为股票价格的非线性合同,能够带来更强的激励效率,适用于能力较高的经理人和质量较差的项目。

关键词: 股票价格, 委托代理, 经理人薪酬

Abstract: Since stock price can reflect the market value more correctly in the long run,it is often used to be the long-run performance measure,which makes the managerial incentive stocks or options to be restricted in the practice. In fact,the managerial options are the nonlinear compensation contracts with the stock price and can bring more strong incentive efficiency. Incentive options fit the situations of managers with higher level of ability and projects with worse quality.

Key words: stock price, agent-principal, managerial compensation

中图分类号:

F069.9

张建森, 蒋露洲. 上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2002, (9): 47-52.

ZHANG Jian-sen, JIANG Lu-zhou. STOCK PRICES OF LISTED COMPANIES AND CONTRACT DESIGNING OF MANAGER SALARIES[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2002, (9): 47-52.

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