关键词: 国有企业, 债务违约风险, 混合所有制改革, 非国有股东派出董事参与治理

Abstract: This paper takes the participation of nonstate shareholders in governance as the starting point to research the impact of mixed ownership reform in SOEs on their debt default risk The results show that nonstate shareholders participate in highlevel governance of SOEs can alleviate the policy burden of SOEs and suppress managements selfish behavior，thereby significantly reducing the risk of debt default Further research finds that nonstate shareholders can achieve their governance effects by dispatching directors to participate in board meetings and exercising shareholder rights more effectively，but the above governance effect is influenced by the power of management of SOEs Finally，this effect is more effective in SOEs in better external institutional environments and in locally controlled SOEs 

Key words: state-owned enterprises, debt default risk, mixed ownership reform, non-state shareholders dispatch directors to participate in governance