关键词: 容错机制, 正向激励, 高风险创新

Abstract: How to improve the innovation ability of stateowned enterprises is a controversial issueBased on the faulttolerant mechanism implemented by stateowned enterprises，this paper studies the innovation of stateowned enterprisesBy constructing a dynamic game model and solving the Nash equilibrium，this paper puts forward two theoretical hypotheses：（1） positive incentive can improve the lowrisk innovation incentive of SOE executives，but cannot improve their highrisk innovation incentive；（2） the combination of positive incentive and faulttolerant mechanism can promote the highrisk innovation incentive of SOE executivesEmpirically，taking the establishment of faulttolerant mechanism implemented by central enterprises as a quasinatural experiment，this paper uses the data of listed companies actually controlled by central enterprises from 2013 to 2019 and adopts multiperiod DID method to verify the above hypothesisFurther research shows that when an enterprise is in a competitive industry or its executives are younger，the promotion effect of fault tolerance mechanism on highrisk innovation investment is strongerThe findings not only provide a new perspective for improving the innovation ability of SOEs，but also provide a basis for optimizing their faulttolerant mechanism

Key words: fault-tolerant mechanism, positive incentive, high-risk innovation