关键词: 混改股权制衡度, 金融资产配置, 代理问题

Abstract: Based on the “crowding out effect” of the existing financial asset allocation on main business in stateowned enterprises, this paper discusses the influence of nonstateowned and stateowned equity checks and balances on financialization from the mixedownership perspective. The study finds that there is a Ushaped relationship between the balance of mixedownership and the level of financial asset allocation, and the promotion effect is more obvious when nonstateowned shares exceed stateowned shares. The mediating effect test finds that, within the “ inhibition” range, the balance of mixed ownership reduces the level of financial asset allocation by alleviating the agency problem, while within the “promotion” range, the balance of mixed ownership improves financial asset allocation by intensifying the agency problem. Further research shows that, compared with longterm investment financial assets, the balance of mixed ownership is more sensitive to shortterm speculative financial assets. There is a linear negative correlation between the balance of mixedownership and the level of financial asset allocation in central enterprise. The relationship is still Ushaped in local stateowned enterprises. The Ushaped relationship between the balance of mixedownership and the allocation of financial assets only exists in industries of commercial competition. This study has certain reference value for the mixedownership reform and the theory and practice of financial asset allocation.

Key words: ownership balance degree of mixedownership reform, financial asset allocation, agency problem