关键词: 监管“扶贫”, 选择性执法, 处罚类型

Abstract: Using data of the firms punished by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2001 to 2015, this paper investigates whether security regulation is affected by poverty alleviation in China. The results show that firms registered in less developed areas receive less serious punishment. That is, regulators will weaken the supervision on firms from economically backward areas, which proves that poverty alleviation effect exists in security regulation. Further, this paper finds that compared with administrative penalties, nonadministrative penalties are more likely to be used as poverty alleviation tools. After controlling the endogenous problems, the above conclusions still hold. Our findings preliminarily reveal the existence of poverty alleviation effect in security regulation, extending the selective enforcement research. Besides, the analysis framework and conclusions of this paper have important reference value for multilayer security market reform in China.

Key words: poverty alleviation in regulation, selective enforcement, regulatory sanctions  ,