关键词: 金融集权与分权 , 信息不对称 , 中央政府 , 地方政府

Abstract: The responsibility of local government about financial regulation and bailout has been increasingly emphasized, but the authorities and responsibilities between central and local government still remains ambiguous This paper analyzes how to design the optimal financial decentralization for central government in theory, based on information, moral risk and financial externality Under financial centralized situation, a country may be in a state of high degree of financial repression, because of the hidden intervention of local government Under financial decentralization, the more important local stateinformation is for a financial policy making and the larger screening cost is, the greater decentralization value is and the more the central government is tolerant of local governments But introducing financial externality, especially crossregional contagious characteristics of financial risks, the central government with strong administrative ability and rich macro financial instruments has a comparative advantage in coordinating regional financial spillover effects and controlling systemic financial risk, compared to the local government So, we believe that financial regime is not an absolute centralizationordecentralization question, but a financial modest decentralization, for seeking the optimal structure of financial decentralization and then guarding against regional and systemic financial risk.

Key words: financial centralizationdecentralization , information asymmetry , central government , local government