经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (1): 111-130.

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金融强监管与股票错误定价:来自资管新规的经验证据

  

  1. 陆蓉、陈凯(通讯作者),上海财经大学金融学院,邮政编码:200433,电子信箱:ck2024sufe@163com。
  • 出版日期:2025-01-16 发布日期:2025-02-18
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家自然科学基金面上项目(72173081;71773072)的资助。

Strict Financial Regulation and Stock Mispricing:Empirical Evidence from the New Asset Management Regulation

  1. School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
  • Online:2025-01-16 Published:2025-02-18

摘要: 金融强监管通过营造公正高效的投资环境和培育成熟理性的投资主体,促进资本市场平稳运行并防范系统性风险。基于这一政策理念,本文以资管新规为准自然实验,实证检验金融强监管对资本市场定价效率的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:资管新规实施后,股票错误定价得到有效抑制,强监管显著提高了市场的定价效率。机制检验表明,金融强监管可以抑制高风险资产的“羊群效应”并约束高杠杆投机行为。异质性分析发现,强监管改善定价的效果在高风险偏好地区及严重信息不对称的样本中更为显著。面对金融强监管,上市公司可以通过提高分红水平和增加实体投资进行市值管理。在经济后果方面,本文发现强监管有利于提高公司的投资效率,实现股价对投资决策的正向反馈。本文不仅为探讨强监管与市场效率关系提供了新视角,还为公司市值管理以及资本市场赋能实体经济提供了重要的政策启示。


关键词: 金融强监管, 资管新规, 股票错误定价, 风险偏好, 市值管理

Abstract: The 2024 Government Work Report proposed the requirement to “enhance the inherent stability of the capital market” The phenomenon of sharp surges and plunges in stock price in the capital market stems partly from institutional deficiencies that fail to effectively regulate and constrain market participants behavior,and partly from the irrationality of market participants,which leads to frequent speculative activities Therefore,it is essential to enhance the pricing efficiency of the capital market to strengthen its inherent stability and better serve the real economy
Between 2015 and 2021,a series of major policies aimed at promoting the highquality development of the capital market were introduced These policies covered various aspects,including market stabilization,advancing openingup,and preventing systemic risks Among these,the Peoples Bank of China,in collaboration with other regulatory agencies,issued the Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management Business of Financial Institutions (commonly referred to as the “New Asset Management Rules”) This guidance explicitly required financial institutions to break implicit guarantee,address unclear leverage structures,and eliminate regulatory arbitrage,among other financial irregularities
This paper selects annual data from Ashare listed companies for 2015—2021 and empirically examines the impact of stringent financial regulation,as represented by the implementation of the New Asset Management Rules,on the stock mispricing The main findings are as follows:(1) Following the implementation of the New Asset Management Rules,stringent regulation improved market pricing efficiency primarily by reducing investors risk appetite and mitigate stock mispricing (2) The specific mechanisms include reducing herding behavior toward highrisk assets and lowering highleverage for speculative trading and asset volatility risks (3) In response to stringent financial regulation,listed companies actively engage in market value management by increasing dividend payouts and real investments (4) In terms of economic outcome,stringent regulation helps improve companies investment efficiency by creating positive feedback between stock prices and investment decisions
This paper sheds new light on the existing literature in three aspects:First,it constructs a causal relationship between stringent regulation and development promotion,offering a new perspective on balancing regulation,risk prevention,and development Second,it innovatively connects stringent financial regulation with investors trading behavior,providing insights into the focus areas for the next phase of regulation after the transition period Third,the findings provide practical methods for market value management of listed companies,such as increasing dividend payouts and boosting real investments to enhance intrinsic value


Key words: strict financial regulation, the New Asset Management Regulation, stock mispricing, risk appetite, market value management