关键词: 数字时代, 国家治理, 官员治理, 发展, 安全

Abstract: Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China，China has accelerated its entry into the digital ageAt the same time，the national governance system，especially the official governance mechanism，has undergone significant changes：first，in terms of governance methods，from emphasizing incentives to emphasizing supervision；second，in terms of performance evaluation，from emphasizing a single economic indicator to emphasizing diversified indicators
To rigorously examine the changes in the governance mechanisms of officials in the digital era，we construct an organizational economic model that includes the higherlevel government，who focus on both the development and the security，and subordinate officialsWe compare three typical contracts：developmentoriented contracts，securityoriented contracts，and multitask contracts，and the key findings are as follows：First，a developmentoriented contract is clearly preferable to a securityoriented contract，unless the security externalities are very large or the probability of a safety accident is very highSecond，if the principal cares about both development and security，she will definitely implement a performance evaluation mechanism of “onevote veto” for safety accidentsThird，an inverted Ushaped relationship exists between the supervision cost and the development orientationWhen the supervision cost is very high，the principal should adopt a developmentoriented performance evaluation mechanism；when the supervision cost is moderate，a multitask performance evaluation mechanism should be adopted；when the supervision cost is very low，a developmentoriented performance evaluation mechanism should be adoptedFourth，the greater the negative externality caused by safety accidents，the more inclined the principal is to adopt a multitask performance evaluation mechanism to ensure that the agent does not neglect safety issues while pursuing economic developmentOn the contrary，if the negative externality of safety accidents is relatively small，the principal may tend to adopt a performance evaluation mechanism that pays more attention to economic development
Compared to existing literature，this paper integrates information technology with governance mechanisms，endogenizes information structures，and reemphasizes the value of supervisionIt expands the literature on incentive mechanisms and performance assessment from a dynamic perspective，arguing for the endogenous evolution of the assessment mechanism （in three stages）It also discusses a special type of nonlinear incentive mechanism，namely the onevote veto，and demonstrates its effective scopeThe research in this paper provides theoretical insights for optimizing official incentive mechanisms and for balancing development and security，and enriches the literature on Chinese official governance
 

Key words: digital age, national governance, official governance, development, security