摘要： This paper theoretically analyzes the effect and mechanism of China's innovative Dishonest Joint Punishment System on alleviating the failure of market reputation punishment and empirically measures the reputation punishment for environmental violations from the capital marketThe empirical evidence suggests：（1）In the most inefficient field，environmental violations，China's listed companies in violation of environmental laws and regulations have received significant reputation punishmentOn average，reputation punishment represents 152% of the market capitalization，and accounts for 9806% of the total punishment（2）The Environmental Dishonest Joint Punishment System is the decisive factor of the reputation punishment of environmental violations in ChinaIt is the main source of the total punishment measured from the capital market（3）The comparative study shows the Environmental Dishonest Joint Punishment System overcomes the problems of improper incentives for enterprise's environmental violations in China and increases the cost of environmental violations of enterprises in China to a level comparable to that of major developed countries