关键词: 网络借贷 , 信息不对称 , 信号传递 , 双边声誉 , 信贷约束

Abstract: This present paper is directed toward the mitigation mechanism of information asymmetry problem in P2P lending from the perspective of signaling transmission and bilateral reputation on the basis of“Renrendai” data. The empirical results show that the mechanism of education signal and bilateral reputation of P2P lending can help alleviate the degree of information asymmetry, improve the efficiency of financial services, promote the rational allocation of resources and reduce the moral hazard after financing. There is an asymmetric alternative relationship between borrowers credit signaling and bilateral reputation. The high reputation effect for the loweducated borrower is relatively higher. Therefore the loweducated borrower is more inclined to build his own high reputation to make up for inadequacy of credibility signaling. However, with the enhancement of borrowers education, the asymmetric effect disappears. The further study found there is a big regional difference in the case of easing the information asymmetry problem. This paper provides a new way to release the financing plight for the long tail crowds. 

Key words: P2P lending , information asymmetry , signaling, bilateral reputation , credit constraints