经济理论与经济管理

• 企业与组织研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管的风险态度与股权激励方式选择*

徐经长1,张璋1,张东旭2   

  1. 徐经长、张璋,中国人民大学商学院,邮政编码:100872,电子信箱:acxjch@ruceducn;张东旭,安徽大学商学院。
  • 出版日期:2017-12-16 发布日期:2017-12-20
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CGL017)、安徽省自然科学基金项目(1308085MG113)的资助。

THE EXECUTIVES RISK ATTITUDE AND THE EQUITY INCENTIVE METHOD#br#

XU Jing-chang1,ZHANG Zhang1,ZHANG Dong-xu2#br#   

  1. 1School of Business,Renmin University of China; 2School of Business,Anhui University
  • Online:2017-12-16 Published:2017-12-20

摘要: 公司如何选择有效的股权激励方式一直是理论研究的重要话题。本文以2006—2016年中国A股实行股权激励的上市公司为研究对象,探究高管的风险态度差异对上市公司股权激励方式选择的影响。研究结果显示,高管的风险回避倾向越强,公司越倾向于授予风险较大的股票期权方式激励高管,以激发高管的风险承担意愿;高管的风险承担水平越高,公司则越倾向于采用风险较小的限制性股票期权方式进行激励,以削弱高管的过度风险追求倾向。进一步研究表明,当股权激励方式基于风险承担与高管的风险态度相匹配时,公司会有更好的业绩表现。本文的研究结论为激励契约设计提供了重要启示。

关键词: 限制性股票 , 股票期权 , 风险态度 , 股权激励机制

Abstract: How to select effective equity incentive method has always been an important topic in theoretical researchThis paper analyzes the impact of executives risk attitude on the company equity incentive method,using Ashare listed companies as research sample which announced implementation of equity incentive during 2006—2016The results indicate that if the risk aversion tendency of executive is stronger,the company is more inclined to grant riskier stock options to motivate executives to be more risktakingIf the senior executives are more strongly tend to take risk,the shareholders prefer to take restricted stock with lower risk to undermine executives excessive risk pursuitThe further study shows that if incentive method meets with the executives risk preference based on risktaking logic,the company will have a better future performanceThe conclusion of this study provides important implications for the design of incentive contracts

Key words: restricted stock , stock option , risk attitude , equity incentive mechanism