关键词: 股权激励 , 动态效应 , 产权性质 , 授予动机 , 实施频率 , 倾向得分匹配法

Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamic effect of equity incentive on operating performance under a longterm time frame，and examines whether and how this dynamic relationship between equity incentive and corporate operating performance can be moderated by property rights, grant motivation  and implementation frequencyThe results show as follows: Equity incentive can not only exert current incentive effect in the event year, but also exist persistent effect in the following 5 years, which presents an inverted ushaped dynamic characteristicCompared with private enterprises, the incentive effect of stateowned enterprises exists a twoyear time lagged effect and can only last for 3yearsCompared to incentive contracts with more stable and continuous incentive, welfare contracts exist only shortterm incentive effect and appear negative effects after the third yearEquity incentive has stronger and more lasting performanceimproving effect for the enterprises with higher frequency of implementation.

Key words: equity incentive , dynamic effect , property rights , grant motivation , implementation frequency , propensity score matching method