对霍氏团队激励机制执行中多重均衡问题的探讨

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2010, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 65-72.

对霍氏团队激励机制执行中多重均衡问题的探讨

易定红¹, 彭鹏²

1. 中国人民大学劳动人事学院, 北京, 100872;
2. 中国黄金集团公司, 北京, 100011

收稿日期:2010-02-16 出版日期:2010-05-16 发布日期:2012-03-01

A STUDY ON THE MULTIPLE-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOLMSTROM TEAM INCENTIVE SCHEMES

YI Ding-hong¹, PENG Peng²

1. School of Labor Relations and Human Resources, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
2. China National Gold Group Corporation, Beijing 100029, China

Received:2010-02-16 Online:2010-05-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 霍姆斯特姆在设计团队激励机制时并没有考虑多重均衡问题,本文着重分析霍氏机制在执行中陷入多重均衡困境的可能性与条件。研究结果表明,团队成员间互补程度的高低是决定多重均衡困境出现与否的根本原因。霍氏机制更适用于广义团队(即管理学意义上的群体),而非狭义团队。因为,正是狭义团队的内在特征———成员之间的强互补性和强依赖性,从根本上导致霍氏机制难以完美执行。

关键词: 团队生产, 激励机制, 多重均衡

Abstract: When Bengt Holmstrom designed incentive schemes for team,he did not pay attention to the multiple-equilibrium problem.In this paper,we analyze the implications of the multiple-equilibrium problem,which may occur in the implementation of Holmstrom team incentive schemes.We prove that the level of member cooperation is a determinant factor that may influence the occurrence of multiple-equilibrium problem.The Holmstrom mechanisms are more suitable for a broad sense of "team" —group,precisely because the intrinsic properties of a narrow sense of "team"—strong complementarities and strong dependence of members fundamentally restrict the perfect implementation of Holmstrom mechanisms.

Key words: team production, incentive scheme, multiple-equilibrium

中图分类号:

F240

易定红, 彭鹏. 对霍氏团队激励机制执行中多重均衡问题的探讨[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2010, (5): 65-72.

YI Ding-hong, PENG Peng. A STUDY ON THE MULTIPLE-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOLMSTROM TEAM INCENTIVE SCHEMES[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2010, (5): 65-72.

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