Abstract: TakingA-shareprivatelistedfirmsinChinafrom2007to2016astheresearchsample,this
paperstudiestheperformancereferenceeffectofexecutivecompensationdecision-makinginprivatefirms.
Theresultsshowthatthereisasignificantlypositivecorrelationbetweentheprivatefirms??executivecompensationandtheirpeer-
groupperformance,whichaccordswiththeexpectationofCEO marketexplanation.
Additionally,managerialabilitystrengthensthispositiveperformancereferenceeffect.FurtheranalysesindicatethattheabovepositiverelationismorepronouncedinarelativelymatureCEOmarket,
andfor
privatefirmshiringprofessionalmanagers.Inconclusion,thispaperis meaningfultounderstandthe
designofexecutivecompensationcontractinChineseprivatefirmsfromtheperspectiveofCEO market.

Key words: privatefirms, executivecompensation, performancereference, CEO market, outsideemploymentopportunities  ,

摘要： 本文以2007—2016年中国A 股民营上市公司为样本,研究民企高管薪酬决策的业绩参照效应。研究发现,民企高管薪酬与参照企业的业绩显著正相关,符合经理人市场解释的预期,而且高管能力会强化这一正向业绩参照效应。进一步地,在较成熟的经理人市场中,高管薪酬与参照业绩的正相关性更为明显。同时,对于聘请职业经理人的民企,其薪酬决定机制更适用于经理人市场解释。本文对从经理人市场视角理解我国民企高管薪酬契约设计有启示作用。

关键词: 民营企业, 高管薪酬, 业绩参照, 经理人市场, 外部任职机会