Abstract: Using data of the firms punished by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2001 to 2015, this paper investigates whether security regulation is affected by poverty alleviation in China. The results show that firms registered in less developed areas receive less serious punishment. That is, regulators will weaken the supervision on firms from economically backward areas, which proves that poverty alleviation effect exists in security regulation. Further, this paper finds that compared with administrative penalties, nonadministrative penalties are more likely to be used as poverty alleviation tools. After controlling the endogenous problems, the above conclusions still hold. Our findings preliminarily reveal the existence of poverty alleviation effect in security regulation, extending the selective enforcement research. Besides, the analysis framework and conclusions of this paper have important reference value for multilayer security market reform in China.

Key words: poverty alleviation in regulation, selective enforcement, regulatory sanctions  ,

摘要： 本文以我国2001—2015年被中国证监会及其下属证监局处罚的上市公司为样本，研究了我国证券市场监管是否存在“扶贫效应”。研究发现，违规企业所在地区的经济发展水平越低，它们受到的处罚程度越轻，即监管机构会相对弱化对落后地区上市公司的监管力度。这表明我国证券市场监管可能存在“扶贫效应”。并且，与行政处罚相比，非行政处罚性监管措施更容易成为监管“扶贫”的手段。在控制了内生性问题后，上述结论仍然成立。本文以我国上市公司为例，初步揭示了监管“扶贫效应”的存在性，丰富了选择性执法领域的研究。同时，本文的分析框架和研究结论对于我国深化多层次证券市场改革具有重要的参考价值。

关键词: 监管“扶贫”, 选择性执法, 处罚类型