Abstract: From the perspective of stock price crash risk, this paper analyzes the economic consequences and mechanism of the young executives' risk preference. Based on the theoretical deduction of “individual cognition view” and “agency conflict view”, using the data of Chinese Ashare nonfinancial listed companies, this paper finds that young executives will significantly increase the risk of stock price crash, and this negative impact mainly exists in private enterprises. Further tests find young executives choose more risky investment projects that could rapidly increase their personal returns in investment decisions. At the same time, the aggravating effect of young executives on stock price crash risk is more pronounced for firms where executives receive compensation, and the stock price crash risk will obviously decrease with the higher proportion of independent directors. These findings indicate that the risk preference of young executives at individual cognitive level is distorted by the agency conflict in the pursuit of selfinterest maximization, which provides empirical evidence for the “agency conflict view” of young executives' risk preference.

Key words: young executive, stock price crash risk, individual cognition view, agency conflict view

摘要： 在企业纷纷实施高管年轻化战略的背景下，本文从股价崩盘风险的视角分析和检验了年轻高管风险偏好的经济后果及其作用机理。本文基于“个体认知观”和“代理冲突观”展开理论推演，采用中国沪深A股非金融上市公司的数据，检验发现，年轻高管会显著加剧企业未来的股价崩盘风险，且这种影响主要存在于民营企业，在国有企业并不显著。进一步针对具体作用机制的检验发现，年轻高管在投资决策中选择了更多能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目，但在不能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目上与年长高管没有显著差异。同时，年轻高管对股价崩盘风险的加剧效应仅仅存在于高管在上市公司领取薪酬的样本企业，且更高的独立董事比例能显著抑制年轻高管的股价崩盘风险加剧效应。这表明，年轻高管个体认知层面的风险偏好被其追求个人私利最大化的代理冲突所扭曲，进而为年轻高管风险偏好的“代理冲突观”提供了实证证据。

关键词: 年轻高管, 股价崩盘风险, 个体认知观, 代理冲突观