THE PREMISE JUDGMENT OF GOVERNANCE ABOUT
 CHINAS RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET FAILURE: 
SUPPLY SHORTAGE OR FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
——Based on 1 938 Households Samples Survey in Geographical 
Area Covered by 26 New Rural Financial Agencies in 5 Provinces

Economic Theory and Business Management ›› 2014, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 101-112.

THE PREMISE JUDGMENT OF GOVERNANCE ABOUT
CHINAS RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET FAILURE:
SUPPLY SHORTAGE OR FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
——Based on 1 938 Households Samples Survey in Geographical
Area Covered by 26 New Rural Financial Agencies in 5 Provinces

CHENG Hui-Xia

School of Government, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China

Received:2014-09-17 Online:2014-12-02 Published:2014-11-16

农村金融“市场失灵”治理前提再判断：
供给不足还是金融排斥
——基于5省26家新型农村金融机构覆盖地域内1 938个农户样本调查

程惠霞

北京师范大学政府管理学院，北京100875

作者简介:程惠霞（1973—），女，四川乐山人，北京师范大学政府管理学院副教授，管理学博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目（10DGL057）

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the findings of the 1 938 households samples survey in geographical area covered by 26 agencies in 5 provinces, this study proved that the current rural financial market failure was not due to the ‘supply shortage’The rational rejection behaviors of rural financial institutions led some farmers and smallmicro enterprises could not get credit services, based on the Pearson correlation analysis of farmer credit obstacles and the regression analysis of the identification degree of farmers to loan channel as nominal variablesThe solution key of the failure governance was not to increase the financial supply simply, but to screen, estimate and control those improper exclusion behaviors implemented by rural financial institutions

Key words: rural financial market failure , supply shortage , financial exclusion , governance

摘要： 本文在新型农村金融机构试点5省26个机构覆盖地域内抽样1 938个农户样本访谈调查基础上，通过农户信贷障碍的皮尔森相关分析和以农户对贷款渠道认同度为名义变量的回归研究证明：相对于“供给不足”而言，现阶段农村金融“市场失灵”更多的是农村金融机构的“‘理性’排斥”行为所致。治理农村金融市场失灵的关键药方不是简单增加供给，而是甄别、判断和监管农村金融机构的不当排斥行为。

关键词: 农村金融市场失灵 , 供给不足 , 金融排斥 , 治理

CHENG Hui-Xia. THE PREMISE JUDGMENT OF GOVERNANCE ABOUT
CHINAS RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET FAILURE:
SUPPLY SHORTAGE OR FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
——Based on 1 938 Households Samples Survey in Geographical
Area Covered by 26 New Rural Financial Agencies in 5 Provinces[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2014, 34(11): 101-112.

程惠霞. 农村金融“市场失灵”治理前提再判断：
供给不足还是金融排斥
——基于5省26家新型农村金融机构覆盖地域内1 938个农户样本调查[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2014, 34(11): 101-112.

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