信息不对称与机制设计理论—2007年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者的贡献

经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2008, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 35-39.

信息不对称与机制设计理论—2007年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者的贡献

杨咸月

上海社会科学院部门经济研究所上海 200020

收稿日期:2007-11-09 出版日期:2008-02-16 发布日期:2012-03-01

Received:2007-11-09 Online:2008-02-16 Published:2012-03-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 由于对机制设计理论的开创及发展做出了巨大贡献,赫维茨(Leonid Hurwicz)、马斯金(Eric S. Maskin)和梅尔森(Roger B. Myerson)获得了2007年诺贝尔经济学奖。机制设计理论如今已成为主流经济学的重要组成部分。

杨咸月. 信息不对称与机制设计理论—2007年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者的贡献[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2008, (2): 35-39.

[1] M.Harris,A.Raviv.Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions[J].Econometrica,1981,(49):1 477-1 499.
[2] R.Myerson.Optimal Auction Design[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1981,(6):58-73.
[3] J.Riley,W.Samuelson.Optimal Auctions[J].American Economic Review,1981,(71):381-392.
[4] P.Semuelson.The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1954,(36).387-389.
[5] J.Marshak,R.Radner.Economic Theory of Teams[M].Yale University Press,1972.
[6] L.Hurwicz.On Informationally Decentralized Systems[A].Radner,McGuire.Decision and Organization[C].North-Holland,Amsterdam,1972.
[7] A.Gibbard.Manipulation of Voting Schemes:A General Result[J]. Econometrica,1973,(41):587-602.
[8] R.Myerson.Multistage Games with Communication[J].Econometrica,1986,(54):323-358.
[9] E.Maskin.Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,(66):23-38.
[10] R.Myerson,M.Setterthwaite.Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1983,(28),265-281.
[11] R.Wilson.Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions[J].Econometrica,1985,(53):1 101-1 116.
[12] J.Laffont,E.Maskin.A Differentiable Approach to Expected Utility-Maximizing Mechanisms[A].Laffont.Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences[C].North-Holland,Amsterdam,1979.
[13] W.Leininger,P.B.Linhart,R.Radner.Equilibria of the Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1989,(48):63-106.
[14] R.Wilson.Auctions of Shares[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1979,(93):675-689.
[15] P.Klemperer.Auctions..Theory and Practice[M].Princeton:Princeton Unversity Press,2004.
[16] T.Groves,J.Ledyard.Optimal Allocation of Public Goods:A Solution to the "Free Rider" Dilemma[J].Econometrica,1977,(45):783-811.
[17] L.Hurwicz,D.Schmeidler.Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto-Optimality of Nash Equilibria[J].Eeonometrica,1978,(46):1 447-1 474.
[18] S.Williams.Realization and Nash Implementation:Two Aspects of Mechanism Design[J].Econometrica,1986,(54):139-151.
[19] R.Repullo.A Simple Proof of Maskin's Theorem on Nash Implementation[J].Social Choice and Welfare,1987,(4),39-41.
[20] T.Saijo.Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem[J].Econometriea,1988,(56):693-700.
[21] T.Palfrey,S.Srivastava.Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1991,(55):17-40.
[22] H.Matsushima.A New Approach to the Implementation Problem[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1988,(45):128-144.
[23] K.Chatterjee,W.Samuelson.Bargaining under Incomplete Information[J].Operations Research,1983,(31):835-851.