科学技术的发展、互联网的普及与数据信息的爆炸式增长催生了自动化技术。本文关注不完全竞争市场中的双寡头企业是否采用自动化技术从事生产这一博弈互动，探讨自动化技术的使用对企业成本控制与产品设计的影响，进行均衡刻画及福利分析。通过综合考虑自动化技术的使用对企业利润函数和消费者效用函数的影响，本文分析自动化技术造成产品的纵向降本与横向趋同这两种效应，基于水平差异化双寡头模型（Hotelling Model）建立统一分析框架，开展理论分析。本文结果表明：（1）企业使用自动化技术固然可以降低成本，但同时出现产品同质化的趋势。这说明自动化技术具有双刃剑效应，企业需要在成本控制和产品差异化之间进行取舍。（2）不同行业的结构特征导致企业竞争均衡存在差异。当自动化技术研发成本低时，降本效应主导，自动化竞争会成为市场均衡；当研发成本高时，同质化风险增加，市场表现为传统竞争；当研发成本适中时，企业策略决定竞争格局，可能出现不对称竞争或混策略竞争。福利最大化的条件与竞争均衡相似，当固定成本满足不同参数范围时可以实现社会福利的最大化。（3）基于利润最大化的竞争均衡并不一定能够实现社会福利最优化：若企业开展传统竞争能够实现社会福利最优，则均衡必然成立；若企业开展自动化竞争或不对称竞争，则社会福利是否最优与均衡是否成立之间无必然联系。本文对于自动化技术博弈的研究，在数字经济成为国家重大发展战略的背景下为政府、企业与消费者的决策提供了新的理论依据。

Advancements in science and technology，the proliferation of the internet，and the explosive growth of data information have given rise to automation technology We analyze the interaction between whether duopoly firms adoption of automation technology in production，and firms cost control and product differentiation，by conducting equilibrium characterization and welfare analysis By comprehensively considering the impact of automation technology on firms profit functions and consumer utility functions，this study analyzes the vertical cost reduction and horizontal convergence effects caused by automation technology，and establishes a unified analytical framework based on the horizontal differentiation duopoly model （Hotelling Model）
Under our model setting，we find that：（1） While the use of automation technology can indeed lower costs，there is also a trend towards product homogenization，suggesting that automation technology has a doubleedged sword effect，requiring firms to make tradeoffs between cost control and product differentiation （2） The structural characteristics of different industries lead to variations in firms competitive equilibrium Specifically，when research and development （R&D） costs of automation technology are low，the cost reduction effect dominates，and market competition tends toward the automated competition equilibrium；when R&D costs are high，the risk of homogenization increases，resulting in the traditional competition equilibrium；and when R&D costs are moderate，firms strategies determine the competitive landscape，potentially resulting in asymmetric competition or mixed strategy competition equilibrium The conditions for welfare maximization are similar to those of a competition equilibrium；social welfare maximization can be achieved when fixed costs fall within particular parameter ranges （3） The profitmaximizing competition equilibrium does not guarantee social welfare maximization：specifically，equilibrium is a necessary condition for social welfare maximization under the traditional competition scenario；however，if firms engage in automated competition or asymmetric competition，there is no inherent link between equilibrium and social welfare maximization Our study of this automation technology game provides new theoretical insights for the decisionmaking of governments，enterprises，and consumers against the backdrop of the digital economy becoming a significant national development strategy