关键词: 数字平台, 算法推荐, 自我优待, 反垄断政策, 救济政策

Abstract: The recent decades have seen a growing number of dualmode platforms such as Amazon and Google Dualmode platforms may favor their own products in the downstream market through search result display，algorithmic recommendations，etc，and discriminate against downstream market competitors Thus，selfpreferencing has become an important policy concern in the antitrust of the platform economy At present，antitrust economics research on the selfpreferencing behavior of dualmode platforms has drawn different views Therefore，how to scientifically recognize the competitive effects of selfpreferencing and how to adopt optimal antitrust remedy policies have become the focus of the issue
This paper focus on exploring the behavioral incentives and competitive effects of digital platforms selfpreferencing via algorithmic recommendations and examining the effectiveness of policies that restrict selfpreferencing The main findings are as follows A monopoly platform will only have the incentive to engage in selfpreferencing when the increase in sales revenue of its own products due to selfpreferencing exceeds the loss in commission An important market structural condition for digital platforms to implement selfpreferencing is that they have strong relative market power on the seller side Selfpreferencing can increase digital platforms market power in downstream markets and induce market foreclosure to competitors However，its impact on consumer surplus and social welfare is uncertain，mainly affected by search costs and commission rates In terms of the effects of different remedy policies，structural separation，neutrality regulation and data isolation all can promote market competition，but their implications on consumer surplus and social welfare are significantly different，and all have certain economic costs 
The policy implications of this paper are： First，the antitrust regulation of digital platforms selfpreferencing via algorithmic recommendations should use reasonable principles to analyze case by case Second，regulation of selfpreferencing should first be subject to a market structure review，with a focus on the platforms market power in the upstream intermediary service market Third，the antitrust review should adopt a threestep approach of “capability  incentive  competition damage” Fourth，the antitrust remedy policy should be selected based on the economic facts of individual cases Fifth，when designing antitrust policies for digital platforms selfpreferencing in China，it is necessary to establish an organic connection between exante regulatory policies and expost enforcement policies and to achieve the best combination of scientific review and effective remedy

Key words: digital platform, algorithmic recommendations, self-preferencing, antitrust policy, remedy policy