关键词: 社会失信, 短贷长投, 融资约束, 失信信息公开

Abstract: Chinese corporations exhibit a significant phenomenon of “shortterm financing for longterm investment”，where the maturity mismatch of investment and financing results in severe debt risks for these enterprises As an important consideration for banks and financial institutions to issue loans，credit will also change the lending behavior of banks and corporations，thus affecting the allocation of corporate investment and financing terms In recent years，the surge in the number of dishonest defaulters in China has become a social focal point Understanding the impact of the social dishonest environment on the corporate “shortterm financing for longterm investment” is an important and urgent issue to explore
Furthermore，Chinas social credit system is undergoing a profound transformation，with traditional areas that were previously governed by informal norms gradually being brought under the jurisdiction of formal institutions Based on this background of institutional evolution，this paper further examines the external governance effect of the dishonest information disclosure system on corporate “shortterm financing for longterm investment”
This study conducted an empirical analysis by matching the data on dishonest defaulters published by the Supreme Peoples Court with data from listed companies from 2007 to 2017，The research finds that：（1） Social dishonesty significantly exacerbates the phenomenon of corporate “shortterm financing for longterm investment”.（2） The impact of social dishonesty is more pronounced in regions with low levels of digital financial development，weaker banking competition，and in corporations with lower management incentives（3） Mechanism tests indicate that social dishonesty increases external financing constraints and internal agency costs for enterprises，thus aggravating the corporate “shortterm financing for longterm investment”.（4）The implementation of the dishonest information disclosure system can reduce corporate financing constraints and internal agency costs，effectively alleviating the tendency of corporations to engage in “shortterm financing for longterm investment” in a socially dishonest environment
Compared to existing literature，the marginal contributions of this paper are as follows：（1） This paper makes up for the limitations of how a single informal system or formal system affects corporate “shortterm financing for longterm investment”，comprehensively examines the micro economic effects of social dishonesty and the disclosure system of dishonesty information，and enriches relevant research perspectives（2） Combined with the dual path of supply side and demand side，this paper explains how social dishonesty affects the investment and financing term allocation of firms through the mechanism of “external financing constraints” and “internal agency costs”，which supplements the traditional firm maturity matching theory（3） This paper provides a basis for correctly understanding the effectiveness of external dishonesty governance mode under the background of social credit system construction

Key words: social dishonesty, shortterm financing for longterm investment, financing constraints, dishonest information disclosure