关键词: 通道费 , 纳什谈判 , 投资努力 , 外部性

Abstract: The formation mechanism of slotting allowance and the regulation have been a dilemma for a long time This paper incorporates the manufactures investment and externality between manufactures into the Nash bargaining model over slotting fees, to see their influence on slotting allowance as well as the welfare effect of slotting allowance This paper shows that slotting allowance is not only affected by the relative bargaining power between manufactures and retailers, but also by manufactures effort costs and externality Though manufactures have no bargaining power, the retailer may also pay the franchise fee to the manufacture to encourage its effort Moreover, in some condition slotting allowance will harm consumer welfare Therefore, it is reasonable to treat cases of slotting allowance as behaviors of abusing market power and apply ruleofreason into its judgment.

Key words: slotting allowance , Nash bargaining , investment effort , externality