关键词: 政绩压力 , 民营企业 , 投资扩张 , 政治关联 , 信贷资源

Abstract:

The administrative intervention of private enterprises investment derives from local governments is one of main reasons for the phenomenon of overinvestment and overcapacityThis paper adopts a sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2011 to investigate effects of prefectural government performance pressure on private enterprises investment, and in particular the role of political connection as well as effects of political performance pressure on allocation of loan resourcesAfter controlling the city fixed effects, the results suggest that local performance pressure affects the investment of private enterprises, the problem of overinvestment is more severe when the local government is confronted with more pressure especially economic growth pressure, while political connection may attenuate this influence which means the problem of overinvestment is relatively less severe for politically connected enterprisesMoreover, the attenuated effect of political connection is more significant when private enterprises have local political connection, local governments have incentives to push private enterprises in nonregulated industries to expand investment with the political performance pressure especially economic growth pressure increasing, and loan resource has played an important role for the relationship between political performance pressure and investment of politically connected private enterprisesThe conclusions would provide some insights into local governments intervention in corporate investment which may lead to overcapacity as well as economic effects of political connection.

Key words: political performance pressure , private enterprises , investment expansion , political connection , loan resource